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almost two decades after the fall of communism, the political landscape 
of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is marked by vivid contrasts. The 
good news is that ten former Soviet-bloc countries are now firmly an-
chored within the European Union, the democratic club established by 
West European democracies half a century ago. Moreover, a recent wave 
of democratic change from Ukraine to the Balkans suggests that even 
those countries which initially failed to achieve a democratic transition 
may get a second chance. The bad news is that several CEE countries in 
which democracy is allegedly consolidated have recently displayed signs 
of backsliding (even if these are not captured in their still very good Free-
dom House ratings). Meanwhile, the complexions of the Rose and Orange 
revolutions are looking less rosy, and the new dispensations in Ukraine 
and Georgia sometimes seem not so different from the old ones. 
 To be sure, such generalizations need to be qualified. Eastern Europe 
in the old sense is no more, and we see a variety of different trajectories 
of democratization in postcommunist countries. Still, it is possible to 
identify certain common patterns and issues. The real question is not “Is 
democracy facing an imminent threat?” Instead, we should ask “What 
kinds of democracies are emerging after the transitions in East-Central 
Europe, and what are their vulnerabilities?” and “What is the signifi-
cance of their troubles from a Europe-wide perspective?” 
 There is little doubt that the democratic crisis is serious and deserves 
to be analyzed thoroughly and without complacency.1 The landscape 
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after the battle displays the following features: In both Poland and Slo-
vakia, ruling populist parties have made coalitions with extreme-nation-
alist parties whose presence in the government would have been un-
thinkable prior to EU accession. Last year, Hungary witnessed violent 
street demonstrations when the conservative Fidesz party refused to ac-
cept the election results on the grounds that the prime minister had lied. 
On the fiftieth anniversary of the 1956 revolution, opposition supporters 
stormed the television headquarters (which, of course, were carrying a 
live broadcast of the takeover!). In Bulgaria, the October 2006 presiden-
tial race came down to a choice between an ex-communist and a proto-
fascist who openly voices his hatred of Turks, Gypsies, and Jews. The 
party of ex-king Simeon formed an unlikely coalition government with 
the ex-communists (a “historic compromise” of sorts), challenged by the 
radical populist movement Ataka, with its politics of resentment (but 
without actual popular mobilization). Czechs and Slovenes have tended 
to produce milder versions of the Central European trend: In Slovenia, 
the conservative populist government of Janez Janša adopted problem-
atic laws on citizenship and the media. In Prague, a stalemated election 
led to seven months with no government, making the Czech Republic 
for a time the largest NGO in Europe! Most Czechs have concluded that 
the political elite has proven its utter uselessness. Both the Polish-style 
politics of frustration and the more benign Czech-style politics of irrel-
evance point to a widespread disenchantment with democracy.
 It is not only Western observers who paint this somber picture. It also 
reflects the concerns of academic analysts, public intellectuals, and politi-
cal figures in the region. Two Polish ex-presidents from opposite political 
backgrounds, Lech Wa³êsa and Aleksander Kwaœniewski, speak in near-
identical terms of threats to Polish democracy. When Bronis³aw Geremek, 
deputy president of the European Parliament, speaks of violations of civil 
rights and democratic freedoms, it is more than an emotional overreaction 
to the new Polish lustration law. Adam Michnik (now director of the daily 
Gazeta Wyborcza), who knows a thing or two about the meaning of civil 
liberties, describes the Poland of the Kaczyñski twins as “a peculiar mix 
of the conservative rhetoric of George Bush and the authoritarian political 
practice of Vladimir Putin. In their attack on the independent press, curtail-
ment of civil society, centralization of power, and exaggeration of external 
dangers, the political styles of Poland and Russia are very similar.”2
 As is often true, Poland can be seen either as an exception to, or a mag-
nifier of, trends present elsewhere in the region. That the latter is now the 
case is suggested by some underlying trends in public-opinion polls. Less 
than two decades after the fall of the communist dictatorships, the Euroba-
rometer survey of December 2006 reveals that trust in democratic institu-
tions is much weaker in Eastern than in Western Europe. To be sure, a clear 
majority of East Europeans (including 62 percent of Poles) believes that 
democracy is better than other forms of government. Nonetheless, about 
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three-quarters of Poles consider democracy too indecisive or incapable of 
maintaining law and order.3 About half (down to 42 percent in the most 
recent poll) consider that “it does not really matter whether the government 
is democratic or undemocratic.” In 2005, half the respondents responded 
that “in some cases a nondemocratic regime may be preferable to a demo-
cratic one.” All the surveys suggest that there is no available alternative to 
democracy, but also that there has been a severe erosion (and sometimes 
collapse) of trust in democratic institutions and political elites. 
The Limits of Linearity
 This worrying trend need not be exaggerated, but it does call into 
question the prevailing linear reading of democratization that has been 
applied to East-Central Europe over the last two decades: a progression 
from liberalization to democratic transition to democratic consolidation. 
Each stage has its own criteria and benchmarks, and it has generally 
been presumed that the process is cumulative—once you reach the next 
stage, you do not regress. It is this last proposition that is being cast into 
doubt by recent developments. The consolidation of democracy cannot 
be reduced to acceptance of alternation in power or to the absence of a 
“veto player” (such as the military in Turkey) capable of challenging the 
constitutional order. Nor can it be assessed solely on the basis of struc-
tural factors such as modernity (as measured by levels of education), 
“stateness” (a major point of difference between Central Europe and 
the Balkans), or the existence of an external anchor such as the EU. The 
CEE countries scored high on all three of these factors, which accounts 
for their post-1989 success. Yet their current troubles also point to the 
linear model’s limits. The CEE setbacks underline the importance for 
democratic consolidation of a civic culture—Tocqueville summed it up 
as the “habits of the heart”—without which the legitimacy and stability 
of democratic institutions will always remain doubtful. 
 The recent populist backlash is a direct challenge to the liberal par-
adigm that had prevailed in the region for a decade and a half. This 
elite-led consensus had two main parts: the primacy of the constitutional 
order and the need for economic liberalization. The first entailed the 
separation of powers, as well as the importance of politically “neutral” 
institutions such as the constitutional court, the central bank, and the 
board supervising public media; constitutionalism took precedence over 
citizenship and participation. The second part implied a need for large-
scale privatization of the economy and its integration into the interna-
tional (primarily European) market. 
 There was an interesting interplay between these two elements, which 
to some extent accounts for the present situation. The ideas of civic 
participation and civil society associated with the dissidents were soon 
eclipsed by the institutionalization of democracy and the formation of 
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a party system. In fact, the weakness of political participation and the 
absence of powerful social actors were seen as favorable conditions for 
the conversion to a market economy. The paradox of simultaneous and 
interdependent political and economic transitions runs something like 
this: To push through radical market reforms you need strong democratic 
legitimacy, such as came from the break with the old totalitarian regime 
in 1989. The free market came to Poland under the banner of a trade 
union called “Solidarity.” Václav Klaus, the Czech prime minister in the 
early 1990s, would not have gotten a chance to launch his market reforms 
without the political legitimacy provided by the presidency of Václav 
Havel. Yet the actual implementation of economic reforms benefited 
from a weak civil society and low political participation. When economic 
results turned out to be generally positive, people became used to markets 
much more readily than they came to embrace democracy. Only a fifth 
of Poles think that their parliament is useful compared to four-fifths who 
find that private companies “contribute to the economic development of 
the country.” The new elites who led the move away from communism 
thrived by consolidating democratic institutions without participation 
and by forming a policy consensus at the expense of politics.
 The posttransitional and postaccession backlash against this consen-
sus marks the close of the post-1989 period. The backlash is giving rise 
to unscrupulous uses of executive power as well as worrisome and po-
tentially dangerous outbursts against basic principles of liberal-demo-
cratic constitutionalism. Yet the backlash can also be seen as question-
ing some of the “self-evident” assumptions of today’s liberal democra-
cies, such as the political “neutrality” of the constitutional courts and 
central banks. Similarly, EU accession was presented as a politically 
“neutral” objective, shared (nuances aside) by all mainstream CEE par-
ties—even though it entailed joining a “single market” and endorsing 
eighty-thousand pages of legal norms. Hungarian prime minister Fer-
enc Gyurcsány’s now-infamous May 2006 speech to his fellow Social-
ist Party members admitted that “for a year and a half we have faked 
governing; instead we lied in the morning, in the evening, and at night.” 
And yet he also said several times that with regard to economic policy, 
“there is no choice.” The populist surge can be read as a response to 
those phrases—to governance as a matter of “faking” government, and 
to the notion that politically “neutral” institutions must always constrain 
policy choices. The populist backlash in Central Europe is nasty and 
often brutish, and we may hope that it remains short. Yet it may also 
herald the return of politics after a period of technocratic ascendance. 
Populism and the Flaws of the Transition-Era Consensus
 This is the background to the onslaught on the transition-era elites 
and their policy consensus, which meant that governments could come 
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and go but similar policies would prevail. The main argument against 
the transition-era consensus is that it was morally and politically flawed: 
The peaceful transition negotiated in 1989 between ex-dissidents and ex-
communists allowed the former to impose their liberal agenda of “pro-
cedural democracy” while the latter converted to capitalism and “free 
enterprise.” This curious mix of a transition beset by “original sin” and 
of the “revolution betrayed” is most explicitly stated in the rhetoric of 
Poland’s Kaczyñski twins. Their notion of democracy hijacked by post-
communist elites includes a conspiracy theory according to which the 
key institutions of parliamentary democracy and the market economy 
were secretly sold out to the ex-communists and their fellow travellers 
among the former oppositionists. 
 The result, according to this view, is moral, political, and economic 
corruption. Hence the dual focus of the campaign against the transition-
era elites: decommunization and anticorruption. Both issues, largely 
neglected in the 1990s, have now returned with a vengeance. The thor-
oughgoing privatization of the CEE economies represented the most for-
midable reallocation of resources since World War II. It was economi-
cally successful, though achieved without a proper legal framework and 
with corruption on a scale commensurate with the endeavor. Now the 
populists have grasped the power of anticorruption rhetoric to delegiti-
mize the existing political and economic elites. 
 Decommunization serves a similar purpose. In the 1990s the region 
was divided between those who implemented decommunization (the 
Czechs and Germans) and those who failed to, whether because they 
would not (Poles and Hungarians) or could not (Slovaks, Romanians, 
and Bulgarians). The debate at that time divided those who thought de-
communization would enable their country to move on to the higher 
tasks of democracy-building from others who feared that it would side-
track the transition with a political agenda oriented toward the past rath-
er than the urgent needs of the near future. 
 Today, the problem of decommunization confronts all three catego-
ries of countries in one form or another. In Poland it has taken the form 
of a new lustration law that affects more than 700,000 people; Hungary 
witnessed a dubious effort to reprise the 1956 uprising; the Czech par-
liament adopted a law in May 2007 establishing an institute of national 
memory modeled on those already operating in Poland and Slovakia.4 
Romania too is now implementing a lustration law.
 It is true that some aspects of coming to terms with the communist 
past were not dealt with in the immediate aftermath of 1989, when “in-
stant democracy” was the motto of the day, and they are now returning 
like a boomerang. But also at work, most obviously in the Polish case, 
is the political instrumentalization of the issue, accompanied by self-
serving authoritarian arguments: To “clean house” by purging corrup-
tion and communist agents we need more powers in our hands, and thus 
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we must do away with some constitutional and institutional constraints. 
Hence, next to Poland’s Institute for National Remembrance, which 
stores and (when needed) releases police files, there is an Anti-Corrup-
tion Institute; moreover, several police and intelligence agencies oper-
ate in parallel, amid great confusion about their responsibilities and a 
complete lack of transparency. A creeping sense of uncertainty and fear 
has reappeared for the first time since the end of the old regime. In the 
name of a struggle against the alleged rule of politically dangerous and 
corrupt networks during the transition years, Poland’s populists resort to 
authoritarian methods, state capture, and nationalist rhetoric.
The Shrinking Influence of a Growing EU
 Is the EU a mechanism for containing the democratic malaise or has 
the union contributed to the malaise’s development? In Central and East-
ern Europe a country’s proximity to Brussels has been perhaps the most 
reliable predictor of the outcome of the democratic transition. Democra-
tization, transformation, and “Europeanization” have been seen as related 
processes that have helped to move countries from electoral democracy to 
institution-building and then to the adoption of EU norms and practices. 
 Recent CEE developments suggest that democratization through EU 
enlargement has reached its limits. EU tutelage works until you get in, 
but once you have joined there are few incentives or means to induce fur-
ther reforms or the observance of democratic norms. EU conditionality 
works best with relatively small and weak states, and its success depends 
on achieving cognitive and behavioral change. Without a change in po-
litical culture, the formal adoption of institutions or norms may merely 
create an empty shell and possibly undermine the EU from within.
 It is striking that most of the pro-European coalitions that dominated 
CEE politics over the last decade or so fell apart as soon as they had 
accomplished the “historic task” of achieving EU membership. In their 
places have arisen harder or softer exponents of Euroskepticism. The 
EU is a very convenient target for populist resentment since it is a liberal 
project—supported by the economic and political elites in charge of the 
recent transition—and implies a redefinition of national sovereignty and 
identity. The current Polish and Czech governments opposed any idea of 
a European constitution and welcomed with relief the outcomes of the 
French and Dutch referenda (though, under pressure, they will probably 
accept a more modest reform of EU institutions). 
 Why do Euroskepticism and populism appear to be growing in both 
old and new member states? Part of the answer is that the EU-accession 
process has also contributed to the abovementioned tendency toward 
“emptying” party competition and politics more generally of their sub-
stance. The EU stands for the rule of law, a single market, shared legal 
norms, and the adoption of European policies in the absence of a corre-
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sponding European politics.5 The latter problem was precisely what the 
failed attempt to adopt a European constitution was intended to remedy. 
Meanwhile, several new members believe that the nation-state remains 
the prime framework of democratic politics but that its influence on EU 
policies is too limited. The Czech government has announced as its pri-
ority for its forthcoming presidency of the EU the shift of powers from 
the EU to member states. The Czech and Polish governments roughly 
share the following outlook: Important international and security issues 
are a matter for the United States and NATO; democratic politics is the 
business of sovereign nation-sates; the appropriate realm of the EU is 
the economy and trade. In essence, these governments see the EU as 
merely an economic supplement to NATO. 
 Such a view, of course, limits considerably the influence that the EU 
can exert on new member-states when questions of democratic norms 
are at stake. The whole EU-accession process was able to promote de-
mocracy because of the accepted asymmetry it entailed. It worked best, 
of course, with those who already shared the assumptions of the Euro-
pean project, but it was also effective in a different way with the illiberal 
elites, who soon discovered that the costs of nonmembership to them 
and their respective countries would be prohibitive. Once a country has 
joined the EU, however, this logic no longer seems to hold, at least not 
in the short term. 
 The main limit that East European populists run up against is the 
sharp reaction to their language or the substance of their proposals on 
the wider European scene. Thus when the Polish education minister ad-
vocates a complete Europe-wide ban on abortion or says “We’ve man-
aged long enough without tolerance, and we’ll manage without it even 
now,” he has to face the “shock and awe” of his European counterparts. 
When leading Polish members of the European Parliament adopt a dec-
laration commemorating General Francisco Franco as an outstanding 
European Catholic or when MEP Maciej Giertych publishes an anti-Se-
mitic pamphlet in Strasbourg, it provokes a scandal in the European Par-
liament and makes front-page news—in Western Europe, not in Central 
and Eastern Europe.6
 One could brush aside such incidents if they did not indicate the re-
surfacing of an antidemocratic political culture. When the Polish head 
of government, in the context of the EU constitutional debate, says that 
if the Germans had not killed so many Poles during the Second World 
War, Poland would be entitled to more votes in the EU, it is much worse 
than a mere factual mistake. Without World War II, of course, there 
would be many more Germans (and Russians) today, and the voting 
asymmetry between Poles and Germans would be even worse! More 
importantly, however, the statement reveals a complete misunderstand-
ing of what the EU stands for, that it is precisely a postwar peace project 
based on reconciliation and interdependence which has now been ex-
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tended to the whole continent. Kaczyñski’s remark reveals that the new 
Polish government elite is obsessed, in both its domestic and its foreign 
policy, with the need for a threatening enemy, be it the Germans, the 
EU, or some domestic conspiracy. This is politics according to Carl Sch-
mitt, not the Kantian ethos of the European Union.
 The populist backlash in Central and Eastern Europe reveals, first 
and foremost, the absence in the new democracies of corps intermédi-
aries, of checks and balances, of truly independent media to serve as 
a counterweight to creeping authoritarianism. It also shows the return 
of dormant strands in the region’s political culture and thus its poten-
tial vulnerability to the authoritarian temptation. These developments 
are contributing to widespread estrangement from the postenlargement 
EU in the older member states. If current trends continue, with new 
members backsliding on democratic practice while pursuing a strident 
defense of “national interests,” we could well see internal EU ties loosen 
to the point where the Union becomes little more than an enhanced free-
trade zone.
The Limits to Populism
 Despite the current political malaise in the new democracies, we 
should resist overdramatizing the populist backlash, which is by no 
means an exclusively East European phenomenon. Populism thrives 
on transgression in its discourse and in the issues it raises, but once in 
power populists tend to resort to some of the policies and practices that 
they once denounced. Cooptation, clientelism, and state capture tend 
to be the pattern rather than the pursuit of radicalization. This is hardly 
good news for the quality of democracy, but at least it helps to defuse 
the populist challenge. As nationalists and populists get closer to state 
power (and to the EU), they may evolve into more traditional political-
party formations. The tendency of populists in power is to try to keep 
the extremist vote (through symbolic politics and deliberate transgres-
sions against “respectable” political discourse) while moving closer to 
the center. This has certainly been the case with Slovakia’s left-wing 
populist movement Smer (Direction), and in Poland the Law and Jus-
tice party (PiS) of the Kaczyñski brothers might be following the same 
pattern. The cost of absorbing populist allies is that one is often led to 
borrow their language and their agenda. The question is which course 
poses the graver threat to liberal democracy—having the populist radi-
cals outside or inside the tent? 
 The EU provides a means to set certain limits to populism. It has done 
so in Western Europe. The case of Austria in 2000 illustrated both the 
EU’s influence and its limits. It tried to ostracize the coalition govern-
ment headed by Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel because it included the 
far-right Freedom Party of Jörg Haider. The EU discovered that it had 
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sent a useful signal (to East European candidates among others) but that 
its hard line could be counterproductive. Eventually Schüssel, thanks 
to skill, patience, and a more flexible approach on the part of the EU, 
helped Haider to self-destruct. The lesson for East-Central Europe may 
be that the EU framework can help to marginalize radical populists and 
absorb the more moderate ones.
 Finally, this is not the 1930s, when economic crises and the rise of 
fascism derailed the post–World War I East-Central European democra-
cies. Today the region has never had it so good. Its economy is growing 
at twice the rate of the rest of the EU. To be sure, the economic benefits 
are unevenly shared and the losers of the transition do provide a base 
for populist parties—but not a base for systemic change. Indeed, un-
like in the 1930s, when both fascism and communism presented fierce 
ideological challenges, today there is no alternative to liberal democracy 
in Europe. Last but not least, there is the existence of the EU itself—a 
major difference from the 1930s, when competing nationalisms and the 
rise of totalitarianism destroyed the European order. For all these rea-
sons, Europe is less vulnerable than other regions facing democratic 
regression. The new EU member states may share some symptoms of 
democratic malaise with Europe as a whole, but they also are protected 
by some specifically European limits to the rise of populism.
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 1. Just as European politicians were inhibited in their discourse prior to joining the EU, 
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